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INTRODUCTION
For the past fifty years, an incomplete and somewhat unsatisfactory
relationship has existed between the economic theory of oligopoly' and
the legal doctrine of liability under the federal antitrust laws.2 Each
relates to the same phenomenon: the ability of a group of firms to avoid
rigorous competition and thus achieve some noncompetitive end, typi-
cally higher-than-competitive prices or other favorable terms of sale that
could not be achieved in a fully competitive market. 3 Yet because of the
fundamentally different conceptual approaches of the two disciplines,
economic theory has contributed relatively little to the development of
the corresponding legal doctrine.4 Indeed, it would not be unreasonable
to argue that the efforts to incorporate economic concepts such as "tacit
collusion," "oligopolistic interdependence," and, most recently, "shared
monopoly" into the legal doctrine have been counter-productive, in
view of the confusion and inconsistencies that have resulted.
The legal doctrine of liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act
focuses on the concept of "agreement" among otherwise competing enti-
ties. The clearest example is when there is direct evidence of face-to-face
1 An oligopoly is an industry in which a relatively small number of firms account col-
lectively for most or all of the industry's total output.
2 Section I of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act are
the relevant statutes. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act states that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce. . . are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). Section 5 does not
contain an explicit requirement of agreement. Its coverage, therefore, may extend beyond the
scope of the Sherman Act. See text accompanying note 145 infla.
3 The commentators differ over whether prevention of monopolistic pricing should be
the exclusive goal of antitrust policy. See generally ANTITRUST LAW AND EcONOMICS (0. Wil-
liamson ed. 1980).
4 Academicians and policy makers have discussed oligopoly theory and antitrust law.
See INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J.
Weston eds. 1974). This discussion has centered primarily on the actual incidence of oligo-
polistic pricing, the methods by which it is achieved, and the appropriate policy response to
oligopolistic pricing. See, e.g., Bain, Relation of Profi Rate to Industi Concentration: American Man-
ufacturing 1936-40, 65 Q.J. ECON. 293 (1951); Brozen, Bain's Concentration and Rates of Return
Revisited, 14 J.L. & ECON. 351 (1971); Demsetz, Industy Structure, Market Rivaly, and Public
Poli, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1973); Posner, Oh'gopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach,
21 STAN. L. REv. 1562 (1969); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act.- Con-
scious Paralle/ism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962).
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communication among competitors in which they pledge to eschew ri-
valry and agree to a price that is presumably more profitable than that
which would be achieved absent the cooperation. 5
The traditional economic analysis of oligopoly, on the other hand,
portrays the process of achieving a noncompetitive end as involving sep-
arate, albeit interdependent, decisions by each firm. Because the
number of firms in an oligopolistic industry is small, each firm recog-
nizes that its own actions will have a substantial impact on the economic
well-being of its rivals and will probably provoke some reaction from
them. If one firm cuts prices in an effort to boost sales, rivals may be
compelled to match the price cut, not only rendering the initial effort to
secure additional volume unsuccessful, but making all firms worse off
than before. When all firms anticipate this chain of events and recog-
nize that a price reduction is against their self-interest, no price cutting
will occur and they can achieve and maintain a noncompetitive price.
6
The economic theory of oligopoly is not incompatible with the pos-
sibility that firms will attempt to secure noncompetitive prices by the
kind of face-to-face communication that constitutes a standard Sherman
Act violation. The theory, however, suggests that the same noncompeti-
tive price might be achieved without any formal agreement; it could
emerge from each firm's recognition of its interdependence with its ri-
vals and the resultant individually rational pricing strategy.
This possibility poses two dilemmas for traditional notions of Sher-
man Act liability. First, it is difficult to apply the notion of agreement,
the doctrinal heart of antitrust liability, to behavior based on individual
calculations of profit maximization. Second, liability, at least in the an-
titrust context, normally requires some form of culpable behavior.
Under the economic theory of oligopoly, however, the individual firm
has done nothing more than to conclude that it would be foolish to
charge less than a "monopoly" price.7
5 Independent of Sherman Act prohibitions, these agreements are void at common law
as restraints of trade and unenforceable in court. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 139 (3d ed. 1981). These agreements may nonetheless achieve a
noncompetitive outcome. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text infia.
6 Oligopoly models differ in their assumptions about rivals' reactions. In the model
developed by Edward Chamberlin, the oligopolistic firm assumes that rivals will match pre-
cisely its output. Where the firms have identical costs, the result is that each firm chooses a
level of output that, when summed across all the firms, yields the same output and price that
a monopolist with the same costs would have chosen. See E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 30-32 (8th ed. 1962). Other models predict results that range
between the pure monopoly price and the competitive price, depending on the assumed reac-
tions of the firms and the number of firms in the industry. See notes 8-12 and accompanying
text infla.
7 A similar problem arises with respect to remedies because it is difficult to tell the firm
how to change its behavior in the future. It is implausible to require firms to pretend that
they have 50 rivals rather than only two or three.
Proposals have been made to eliminate the requirement of culpable conduct and to al-
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This Article presents an alternative economic model of oligopoly
and uses that model to explore the desirability of preventing certain
types of oligopolistic behavior under existing antitrust law. This ap-
proach rejects the economist's traditional dichotomy in which noncom-
petitive performance results either from formal agreement or from
individual profit-maximizing behavior in an oligopolistic context. The
policy dilemma associated with the textbook case of oligopolistic inter-
dependence remains conceptually troublesome under the suggested ap-
proach.. The practical consequences of that dilemma, however, are
substantially diminished because oligopolistic behavior frequently can
be characterized to suggest culpable behavior and allow for effective
relief.
The first section of this Article presents the model, highlighting
three components of the process by which firms in an oligopolistic set-
ting avoid the rigors of competition. The first component outlines the
two fundamental tasks that firms in any oligopolistic industry must ac-
complish to achieve and maintain noncompetitive performance. The
second component outlines the structural or environmental factors that
make it more or less difficult to accomplish those tasks. Thethird com-
ponent of the process outlines specific means used to accomplish the
tasks under any particular set of structural conditions.
The second section of this Article applies the model to two ap-
proaches that courts have used to analyze situations in which oligo-
polists apparently have succeeded in achieving a noncompetitive end,
but where direct evidence of a formal agreement is lacking. The first
approach is used when an agreement not to compete may have been
made, but the evidence is largely circumstantial and the plaintiff asks
the court to infer a formal conspiracy. The second approach is applied
when there is evidence of an agreement but the agreement is not a "na-
ked" restraint, e., a convenant not to compete. Rather, the terms of the
agreement are facially neutral or even procompetitive, such as an ex-
change of information on prices or production levels. The court must
determine whether, given the structural context, the agreement may
lead to anticompetitive effects that outweigh any competitive benefits.
In both situations, the economic model helps to clarify the issues and
provides a more secure basis for deciding when liability is appropriate.
The third section uses the economic model to develop a standard of
liability for situations in which there is neither direct evidence nor even
low structural relief, typically dissolution of the largest firms, when consistently poor perform-
ance can be demonstrated. See, e.g., C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 111-18 (1959). The Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 3832,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), would have established a special commission to consider proce-
dures for eliminating economic concentration, including dissolution. See 118 CONG. REC.
24925-35 (1972); NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PRO-
CEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 151-62 (1979).
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an implication of any conventional agreement. Rather, an undesirable
outcome, such as identical higher-than-competitive prices, is traced to
certain practices undertaken by one or more firms. These "facilitating
practices" form the basis of antitrust liability, particularly under the so-
called "shared monopoly" theories of the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission and the recent prosecutorial efforts made
under that label.
I
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF OLIGOPOLY BEHAVIOR
A. The Classic Theory of Oligopo/y
The classic economic theory of the firm rests on the premise that
individual firms attempt to maximize profits in the context of certain
specific assumptions about demand and unit costs. For example, the key
characteristic of a perfectly competitive industry is the assumption that
the demand curve facing each firm is perfectly elastic (horizontal) at the
competitive price. The firm can sell all that it wishes at that price.
Should it attempt to charge a higher price, however, it would sell noth-
ing at all.
Each firm thus perceives itself as a price taker, because it cannot
profitably influence the market price by its own output decisions. Ac-
cordingly, the rational, profit-maximizing strategy is to expand output
until the incremental cost of an additional unit would equal or exceed
the market price. When all firms act in this way, the market price is
determined at a level just sufficient to cover the costs of production;
firms do not earn supra-competitive profits."
A monopolistic industry differs from a competitive industry in the
traditional literature by virtue of a different assumption about demand.9
Because a monopolist is by definition the only firm producing a particu-
lar product, it can elevate price above a level that just covers its costs
without losing customers to rival firms.' 0 As a result of this different
assumption, a profit-maximizing monopolist will charge a price above
the competitive level.
The classic theory of oligopoly is premised on the same kind of indi-
8 More precisely, price exactly covers each firm's incremental costs. So long as entry
into and exit from the industry are without cost and no firm has lower costs than its rivals,
price will also just cover average costs; no firm will earn monopoly profits.
9 Differing assumptions about costs also may be necessary to explain why the industry
has only a single firm. When unit costs decline as a function of a firm's rate of output, for
example, the industry will normally degenerate into a single firm.
10 The monopolist will lose some customers because of the economist's law of downward
sloping demand. At higher prices, fewer units will be sold. The profit-maximizing strategy
for the monopolist is to find that level of production at which any further reduction in output
(caused by raising price) will reduce total revenues by an amount greater than the reduction
in total costs, causing total profits (revenues minus costs) to diminish.
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vidual profit-maximizing calculus as that embodied in the perfect com-
petition and monopoly models. In contrast to the monopolist, the
individual oligopolist has rivals. In calculating its most profitable price
and output, the oligopolist cannot ignore the fact that if it chooses a
price higher than the competitive level, rivals can undercut its price and
encroach upon its market share, thereby rendering the initial price in-
crease unprofitable.
In contrast to the firm in a perfectly coinpetitive market, however,
the oligopolist does not expect its rivals to behave in this aggressive man-
ner. Rather, it assumes that rivals will not expand their output at all,
and under the most favorable assumption, that rivals will follow its
move by matching its price and similarly reducing output." This as-
sumption results from the belief that when the number of rivals is small,
each will realize that their fortunes are interdependent. Any one firm's
aggressive action will, because of its perceptible impact on its rivals'
sales volume, inevitably be self-defeating; such action induces retaliation
that ultimately renders all rivals worse off.
12
If this characterization of oligopoly is accurate, a policy dilemma
clearly exists. No specific element of any firm's behavior appears culpa-
ble. Each firm is proceeding rationally on the basis of assumptions
about how rivals will behave. These assumptions are derived not from
any formal commitment by rivals to behave in a specific way, but from
the fact that the small number of firms makes it rational for rivals not to
attempt to take advantage of each other. A firm is hardly likely to be
ignorant of such obvious datum as the number of firms in the industry;
nor can it reasonably be expected to ignore the implications of that in-
formation. Thus, any behavior-related theory of antitrust liability neces-
sarily fails to prevent the noncompetitive price that results from this
kind of "pure" oligopoly behavior.' 3
11 The most favorable assumption comes from the Chamberlin model. See E.
CHAMBERLIN, supra note 6, at 30-32. The most widely cited of the original models is that of
Augustin Cournot. According to Cournot's model, each firm naively expects that its rivals
will maintain the same level of output as it reduces its own output and raises price. As each
firm behaves symmetrically, thereby rendering the original expectation overly pessimistic, the
price that emerges will be above the competitive level. It will, however, deviate from the pure
monopoly price in direct relation to the number of firms.
12 As the number of firms increases, the aggressive actions of any one firm have less of a
perceptible impact on each of its rivals and, consequently, are less likely to provoke retalia-
tion. When each firm sees an opportunity to take advantage of its rivals, cooperation breaks
down. When the number of firms is infinitely large, the market yields the competitive price.
Seegrneral4y F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
151-68 (2d ed. 1980).
13 This dilemma has given rise to frequent efforts to fashion a kind of "no-fault" anti-
trust law for oligopoly in which dissolution of large firms into several smaller entities would be
the appropriate form of relief. See note 7 supra. However, Judge Richard Posner takes a
different view of the feasibility of attacking "pure" oligopoly behavior under the current anti-
trust laws. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 39-77 (1976).
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B. An Alternative Model of Ohigopol y
Although the policy dilemma posed by pure oligopoly may be
troublesome, the dilemma may be more theoretical than practical. The
kind of classic oligopolistic interdependence that, by itself, suffices to pro-
duce seriously noncompetitive performance is likely to be rare. The al-
ternative approach developed in this Article focuses on the tasks that an
industry must accomplish to enjoy reasonably stable noncompetitive
prices, the structural conditions that may make the accomplishment of
those tasks more or less difficult, and the specific means for accomplish-
ing the tasks in a given structural setting.
1. Oh'gopoly Tasks
A successful oligopoly must accomplish two main tasks: (1) estab-
lish a mutual understanding or consensus regarding the correct price
and division of output, and (2) promote mutual confidence that there
will be adherence to these decisions. The first is straightforward. If an
industry optimal price is to be established, some consensus must be
reached on that price. This may involve the resolution of any disagree-
ment among the firms as to the correct price, and the communication of
the ultimate "decision" to all concerned parties so that rivals are able to
implement the same price.
The second task stresses the degree of confidence regarding adher-
ence. Absent such confidence, there is less incentive for individual firms
to adopt the consensus decision. Firms may fear aggressive competition
by rivals and will defend themselves by deviating from the consensus at
the start. The existence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
such as information exchanges may be an important ingredient in estab-
lishing this mutual confidence.14
The analytical value of characterizing the two tasks in this way is
that both involve achieving a certain state of mind among the oligo-
polists. Each firm is aware of the price that, on balance, is the best
attainable,15 and each knows that others are similarly aware. Further-
more, each firm has confidence that its rivals will not deviate from this
consensus price. With this achieved, each can charge the consensus
price without fear that it will be victimized by others' ignorance of the
right price or by unwillingness to adhere to that price.
16
14 G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 41-45 (1968).
15 Although the consensus price might not be the "absolutely best" price for particular
firms, these firms may prefer to accept the consensus price rather than face the alternative
chaos, ie., competition.
16 This common state of mind might be characterized as agreement. As will be demon-
strated, however, this state of mind can arise in many ways, and the distinctions suggested
below between lawful and unlawful conduct will depend less on the fact of the "agreement,"
defined in this way, than on the means of reaching this agreement. See notes 49-52 and ac-
companying text infra.
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2. Accomplishing the Oligopoo Tasks
The exact process of achieving a consensus price will depend on the
context in which the product is sold. In a sealed bid auction, for exam-
ple (or more generally, in any setting in which one seller's price is not
routinely made known to its rivals), each firm must independently cal-
culate what it perceives to be the optimal industry price, given its esti-
mates of demand in relation to the costs of other firms in the industry.
Each firm, however, must also plan for the possibility that its rivals'
calculations will yield a different desired price-not because rivals are
behaving strategically, z£e., deliberately trying to undercut, but simply
because of differing perceptions about demand or cost conditions, or dis-
agreement about the implications of those factors for the desired price.
Given that typically no firm wishes to quote a substantially higher price
than its rivals, it is possible that each firm may need to consider an ad-
justment, usually downward, from its own estimate of the optimal price.
A more favorable context exists where firms can routinely observe
rivals' prices. Although each firm may still have its own ideas about
what price is best for the industry, less uncertainty exists as to what price
rivals have calculated. One firm, a "price leader," initiates a higher
price. A rival can match the price leader or post its own price. The
leader and other rivals can then decide whether to match. Depending
on the industry, this process can go on for several rounds before a con-
sensus is reached. Absent the opportunity for more direct communica-
tion, however, it is far from obvious that the industry will typically
achieve the optimal price.1 7
For the second task-instilling a mutual sense of confidence in ad-
herence to any consensus-the basic difficulty is the incentive for an
individual firm to undercut any consensus price to procure additional
business. The classic theory of oligopoly relies on the small number of
firms to ensure that, in fact, no additional business can be secured.1 8
This theory postulates that with only a few firms, rivals would notice
additional sales made by one price-cutting competitor and feel com-
pelled to respond with comparable price cuts. The initial price cutter,
therefore, would not wind up with a permanently greater volume of
sales, and the price would be less than the original consensus price.
The would-be price cutter, anticipating this chain of events, will,
according to the theory, resist the temptation and adhere to the consen-
sus price. Moreover, each firm believes that its rivals will make the same
calculation. Therefore, no firm that either initiates or follows another's
price increase need worry that cheating will take place, and the requisite
17 See notes 41-43 and accompanying text infra.
18 Professor Stigler first developed this theory rigorously. See Stigler, A Theor of Oligop-
o'y, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
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state of confidence is reached-not as the result of any formal commit-
ment by rivals, but simply as the natural result of a highly concentrated
industry structure.
3. Complicating Factors
Whether firms can achieve a stable noncompetitive price depends
on the centrifugal forces or "complicating factors" that interfere with
the accomplishment of the two oligopoly tasks. Three broad categories
of complicating factors are most significant: industry structure, the na-
ture of the product, and the nature of sales. 19 Other factors exist, some
of which might be peculiar to a single industry or specific situation, but
most factors of any significance can fit under these headings.
a. Industg Stucture. The number and size distribution of firms in
an industry affects the difficulty of accomplishing the oligopoly tasks.20
In general, the greater the number of firms and the greater the differ-
ence in firm sizes, the more difficult it is to accomplish the oligopolists'
tasks. The larger the number of firms and the greater their variance in
size, the more likely that nontrivial cost differences among firms will
exist, thereby complicating the problem of calculating the optimal in-
dustry price. Moreover, significant cost differences enhance the possibil-
ity of disagreement among firms; the best industry price may be too low
for the high-cost firm and too high for the low-cost firm.2' Finally, there
is the coordination problem of orchestrating the costs and preferences of
a large number of firms into a united front; a maverick may enter the
market, unwilling to participate in any agreement, lawful or unlawful.
The number and size distribution of firms also affects the likelihood
of adherence to any initial consensus on price. Any firm contemplating
a price reduction must calculate the additional revenue it expects to
gain.22 Assuming that the price-cutting firm must cut prices for all of its
19 Similar lists appear in discussions of cartels. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 11, at
199-227; Hay & Kelley, An Empirical Survq of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON. 13, 14-
17 (1974).
20 Considerable debate persists as to the single best summary statistic. While the four-
firm concentration ratio has commonly been used, the newly issued Justice Department
Merger Guidelines emphasize an alternative measure, called the Herfindahl Index. For a
discussion of the Herfindahl Index and its relation to the concentration ratio, see F. SCHERER,
subra note 12, at 56-59.
21 It might appear that the low-cost firm can always get its own way by simply charging
the price it prefers, and the high-cost firm has no choice but to accept the relatively low price
selected by the group. However, if the high-cost firm loses money, even at the conspiracy
price, it may cut price in a desperate attempt to win a larger share of the business. This
possibility may induce more efficient rivals to select a higher price than they might otherwise
prefer.
22 The larger volume normally resulting from lower prices must be weighed against the
possibility that rivals will discover and quickly match the price cut, leaving the initiator with
lower prices but little or no additional volume. The ability to get away with secret price cuts
is itself linked to the size distribution of firms. See note 16 and accompanying text supra. In
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customers, not just the marginal business that it hopes to pick up, the
firm will reduce prices only if the expected increase in volume 23 is suffi-
ciently large to compensate for the profits foregone on those sales that
could have been made at the higher price.
In general, the smaller any single firm's market share, the greater is
the incentive for that firm to deviate from the consensus price. Where
the prospective price cutter is one of ten equally-sized firms, for exam-
ple, the profits to be gained from additional volume may dwarf any
profits foregone on sales at the original price. Thus, even if an initial
consensus is established, one firm may immediately attempt to charge a
lower price in the hopes of increasing its profits. Alternatively, where a
given firm already enjoys half the market, it may require a more ex-
treme set of circumstances to make the trade-off attractive. Not only is
the potential gain in volume limited to the portion of the market that
the oligopolist does not already control, but the likelihood that a secret
price cut will be detected is greater. Therefore, rivals will have some
measure of confidence that the larger firm is less likely to initiate a price
cut, and rivals' willingness to adhere to the original consensus is thereby
enhanced.2 4
In summary, the less concentrated the industry, especially if costs
are unequal, the less likely it is that the simple recognition of some oligo-
polistic interdependence will be enough to attain the consensus price
and maintain confidence about adherence to that price. Put differently,
if a stable noncompetitive price is to be achieved, some additional steps
will probably have to be taken to supplement the basic oligopolistic
forces.
b. The Nature of the Product. The characteristics of the product can
complicate any effort aimed at achieving and maintaining a noncom-
petitive price. One distinguishing characteristic, for example, is whether
the product is a single item or actually an entire product line.25 The
broader the product line, the greater the number of individual prices to
determine and maintain. Setting and maintaining an array of prices
compounds the problems previously discussed. Moreover, when a full
general, an increase in the number of firms decreases the likelihood of detection. See Stigler,
supra note 18, at 59.
23 The firm must also consider its ability to expand its production without sharply in-
creasing costs. Decreasing the elasticity of individual firms' short-run supply curves at the
consensus price decreases the incentive of an individual firm to attempt to increase its market
share through price cutting and reduces the cheating problems faced by a less concentrated
industry.
24 This does not protect the large oligopolist from efforts by smaller rivals to expand
market shares. Hence, less cheating can be expected where the remaining half of the market
is more concentrated.
25 For example, referring to "the price" of steel is somewhat misleading. In reality there
are dozens of different items in the product line of steel and each item may have "extra"
characteristics that are at least nominally priced separately from the base product.
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product line exists, cheating can take the subtle and less detectable form
of giving a customer a "top-of-the-line" item when he has paid only for
a "middle-of-the-line" item.26
Another potentially distinguishing characteristic is the interchange-
ability of the sellers' product--either in fact, or perhaps only in the
mind of the buyer. If products are differentiated, no single price will
create equilibrium in the market. This complicates the problem of
choosing the consensus "price," because an array of prices, one for each
seller, may be necessary. 27 In addition, the selected price structure is
likely to be fragile. Shifts in either the actual characteristics of any
firm's product or in consumers' preferences for one seller's product over
another's can upset the market shares associated with any given price
structure and thereby cause the consensus to collapse. On the other
hand, price cutting may be reduced where products are differentiated,
because one seller's volume may be less sensitive to another's price re-
ductions than where the products are fungible. If so, there is less motive
to cheat and less risk of a rival cheating.
One important dimension of product differentiation is that associ-
ated with location. For a steel customer in Detroit, the steel from a
seller in Gary, Indiana, and the steel from a seller in Pittsburgh may not
be perfect substitutes if the buyer must pay the freight from the seller's
plant. Moreover, even if equilibrating differentials can be worked out at
a particular time, changes in freight rates that disproportionately affect
different locations will complicate the maintenance of a noncompetitive
price structure.
Products custom-made to the buyer's specifications introduce a fur-
ther complication, because each sale represents a distinct product with
its own price. Even where there is a collective will to avoid price compe-
tition, it will be difficult for firms to sense what price the group should
offer to a particular customer.
Another important product characteristic is the degree to which a
product is subject to technological change. This is a complicating factor
for two reasons. First, even where the technological change is largely the
result of exogenous forces affecting all firms in the oligopoly more or less
equally, the optimal product price may change over time, periodically
requiring a new consensus.28 Second, the possibility of firm-specific
technological change raises a new dimension to the problem of cheating,
26 Heflebower, Toward a Theog, of Industrial Markets and Prices, 44 Am. ECON. REV. 121,
132-33 (1954).
27 Product differentiation may exist solely because prices have been fixed at super-com-
petitive levels. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1579-80.
28 A variant of the technological change phenomenon is inflation. Where inflation is
significant, prices must change periodically or today's optimal price may become unaccept-
ably low. Frequent revision complicates the problem of setting a price by creating more
chances for the consensus to break down.
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one that may be particularly serious where the improvement cannot
promptly be matched by rivals. If an innovating firm can be guaran-
teed a substantial lead time over its rivals, the usual disincentive to
cheat arising from the prospect of rapid retaliation will be absent.
Finally, the ratio of fixed to total costs is also an important product
characteristic. When fixed costs are high relative to total costs, the in-
centive to shade price is large because the margin between price and
variable cost is considerable. 2 9 In addition, in a business downturn the
pressure to gain additional volume grows with the increased threat that
large losses will lead to stockholder unrest and, possibly, to bankruptcy.
With a substantial incentive to shade prices, there is less likelihood of
achieving the mutual confidence necessary to establish the consensus
price with any degree of permanence.
c. The Nature of Sales. A variety of different characteristics of the
way sales are made either diminish or complicate the problem of main-
taining a noncompetitive price. The present focus, however, will be on
the two characteristics that appear most important: lumpiness and
secrecy.
Lumpy sales occur when firms make relatively few sales per year,
with each sale accounting for a sizable portion of annual income. Major
weapons systems, large commercial aircraft, and turbine generators are
characterized by relatively lumpy sales. Toothpaste, cereals, and
automobiles, on the other hand, enjoy relatively continuous sales. Any
product for which the number of customers is small can become lumpy,
even where consumption occurs in many small, discrete units, if long-
term contracts are feasible.
Lumpy sales are a complicating factor because they may create sig-
nificantly higher incentives for cheating. By lowering price for one or
two transactions, a firm can substantially increase its annual sales vol-
ume; by the same token, the opportunity for effective retaliation is corre-
spondingly diminished, at least in the short term. With continuous sales,
on the other hand, cheating may increase business by only a small per-
centage before it is discovered, with the result that the price cutter may
face quick and effective retaliation.
Secret sales are those in which rivals do not naturally learn the ac-
tual price that any given seller received for a particular transaction. In
contrast, with open sales the price routinely appears on the item, or the
same mechanism that informs the customer of the price similarly in-
forms rivals.30 The practice of open sales may allow one firm to act as a
price leader and take the initial responsibility for posting a price in-
29 See Hay & Kelley, supra note 19, at 17.
30 Continuity reinforces the information value of open sales. The rival has confidence
that the walk-in customer, representing only a trivial potential for adding to the firm's vol-
ume, is actually paying the posted price; it seems unlikely that an individual supermarket
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crease. This gives all firms an opportunity to observe the degree to
which rivals are following. Depending on the individual industry, a suc-
cession of price moves may be possible within a brief period of time,
permitting the industry-optimal price to be approached incrementally
in a trial-and-error fashion.3' By contrast, when sales are secret, the in-
ability to observe rivals' responses and the risk of posting a price that is
substantially higher than its rivals' may make any one firm substantially
more timid about initiating an increase.
Another aspect of open sales is that noncompetitive behavior such
as price cutting can be discovered fairly rapidly. For example, super-
markets can learn reasonably quickly when another supermarket has re-
duced the price of one of its products. 32 Similarly, the U.S.
Government's opening sealed bids to all interested parties makes price
cutting instantly detectable. Were most government purchases not ex-
tremely lumpy, and were the product less frequently made to order
(such as a weapons system), successful oligopoly pricing might occur
even more frequently on such purchases.
In contrast, secret sales serve to disguise discounts. Although a firm
that adheres to the original consensus price might eventually infer from
its own loss of sales that a rival had been discounting, any attempt at
retaliation might come too late to deter the prospective cheater. Faced
with this prospect, even the firm that does not seek additional volume
may initiate price cuts as a defensive measure against the threat of ri-
vals' price cuts.
4. Measures to Overcome Complicating Factors
An oligopolistic industry might still achieve and maintain a non-
competitive price solely by virtue of oligopolistic interdependence-the
mutual recognition that adherence to a common noncompetitive price is
in the individual self-interest of all firms. The previous discussion sug-
gests, however, that such an oligopoly model is based upon certain im-
plicit assumptions about the structure of the industry, the nature of the
product, and the marketing process. If these implicit assumptions are
not satisfied as the result of the presence of significant "complicating
factors," it seems unlikely that an oligopoly will achieve joint profit
maximization absent certain compensating measures. These compen-
sating measures, which permit firms to overcome or mitigate the signifi-
cance of the complicating factors, fall into two general categories: the
familiar notion of formal overt collusion, and a less familiar category
shopper, for example, could bargain for a discount from the marked price of canned
tomatoes.
31 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
32 Some insulation, however, may result from the large array of prices to be compared.
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labeled "indirect collusion. '33
a. Formal Collusion. Direct communication between business rivals
is the distinguishing characteristic of formal collusion. The prototype of
formal collusion is the smoke-filled room in which all the rivals engage
in face-to-face communication, although in an era of conference calls
and computers that can talk to one another, less dramatic settings can
be employed to the same end. Formal collusion serves a number of pur-
poses in the context of the tasks and complicating factors related to
achieving a noncompetitive price. First and foremost, formal collusion
is ideally suited to working out the industry price. Firms can compare
demand estimates and discuss relative costs and production capacity. If
disagreement exists, the firms have the opportunity to talk and possibly
reach a compromise. Side payments are also a possibility, perhaps
through allocating the burden of any necessary production cutbacks.
Upon reaching a consensus, all participants know the right price.
Formal collusion also communicates each firm's intention to adhere
to the consensus price. Perhaps because some honor among thieves ex-
ists, these professions of intent may help establish the mutual confidence
necessary to initiate the noncompetitive pricing. Furthermore, formal
collusion can be used to set up a monitoring or enforcement mechanism
and, perhaps, a mechanism for resolving subsequent problems arising
out of uncertainty or miscalculation.
The actual mechanics of the collusion will differ depending on the
complicating factors encountered. 34 For standard shelf items sold from
a relatively narrow product line, the price may be set. For a broader
product line, such as different grades or thicknesses of plywood, or a
product whose relevant attributes are not fixed, such is coal of differing
BTU content, a price formula may be more appropriate. For a product
that can be sold with tailored characteristics, such as steel, a method for
treating "extras" is necessary. For products with a large shipping cost,
firms may establish a plan of uniform delivered or zoned pricing.35 For
unique products, such as building construction, some form of standardi-
zation may be necessary before an effort to coordinate prices can even
begin. Finally, for complicated products that defy any effort to coordi-
nate prices directly, firms may allocate customers or territories, with
each firm free to determine prices for its "own" customers. 36
33 This category is closely related to what other commentators have called "facilitating
practices." See, e.g., Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices: The Prob-
lem of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 881, 903 (1979).
34 See notes 19-32 and accompanying text supra.
35 See notes 46-47 and accompanying text infra.
36 This method also may be efficient for products characterized by lumpy sales, where
identical prices are no guarantee of a predictably fair division of market shares. Allocation of
customers or territories, however, would be impractical for products experiencing rapid but
uneven growth in demand or rapid customer turnover.
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The agreement emerging from the smoke-filled room is not a legally
enforceable contract. Rather, through the process of direct communica-
tion, each party becomes aware of the consensus price and of its rivals'
intentions to adhere to that price. With that state of mind established,
each firm leaves the room and only later actually performs the profit
calculus that determines whether it adheres to the consensus price or
charges some other price. Obviously, the process may not be success-
ful;3 7 one can have direct communication without developing mutual
understanding and confidence.3 8
b. Indirect Collusion. Were formal collusion not clearly illegal
under the antitrust laws, it would be the preferred method of achieving
a noncompetitive price. It provides the greatest opportunity for ex-
change of information, resolution of disagreement, and communication
of intentions.3 9 Complicating factors may make the achievement of a
noncompetitive price impossible without formal collusion. 40 However,
practices that fall short of formal collusion may be adequate substitutes
in some cases. These practices are referred to as "facilitating practices,"
and their use in achieving a noncompetitive outcome is referred to as
"indirect collusion."
The practices described below fall short of formal collusion, yet
each appears to go beyond what is contemplated in the model of "pure"
oligopoly. While the list is not exhaustive, it reveals how the practices
may facilitate the necessary tasks.
(i) Augmented Price Leadership. The most basic kind of price leader-
ship, in an oligopolistic industry where sales are open, has already been
discussed.4 ' The primary feature of price leadership in that context is
for one firm to make the initial effort to establish a noncompetitive
price. Other firms can observe the price directly and decide whether to
match the first firm's price or to post some other price. At the same
time, the first firm can observe and react to its rivals' actions. 42
This kind of simple price leadership may be ineffective in some con-
texts. For example, prices may not routinely be posted in such a way
37 Even formal collusion may not work in the presence of sufficient complicating factors.
For some examples of characteristics conducive to long-lasting cartels, see Hay & Kelley, supra
note 19, at 14-17.
38 Correspondingly, as in the case of pure oligopoly, one can have mutual understanding
and confidence without direct communication. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text infra.
39 Formal collusion still occurs occasionally, despite the legal deterrent.
40 See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
41 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
42 Each firm's confidence about the outcome of such a process may be heightened if the
process takes place in a historical context in which the tradition of leadership is well estab-
lished. Although some risk that the process may break down always exists, a fair degree of
assurance can exist without a formal "renewal of vows." Possible explanations of how a tradi-
tion of price leadership gets started include trial and error, or a previous episode of formal
collusion.
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that rivals have access to them. Where simple price leadership will not
work, more elaborate versions may be observed. Firms may make pub-
lic announcements about pending price increases, often well in advance
of their effective date. This allows time for several rounds of counterpro-
posals in achieving a consensus. Where mutual confidence does not flow
naturally from the structure of the industry, perhaps because there are
too many firms, it can be shored up if the leader has the ability and
willingness to discipline price cutters by substantially lowering prices for
a period.4 3
This kind of "augmented price leadership" can be deliberate, and it
can have effects comparable to, if not quite as effective as, the effects of
face-to-face discussions. Rivals can become aware of the consensus price
and know, partly from reference to the historical context, that all other
rivals are similarly aware. Confidence in adherence may come partly
from the tradition of following the leader, but may be reinforced by
deliberate disciplinary actions.
(ii) Information Exchange. Exchanges of information on recent
prices, sales, operating rates, and other data among competitors44 may
help accomplish the oligopoly tasks. Where sales are not open and pub-
lic announcements are impractical, information about a particular
firm's recent prices can be a pointer toward a new optimal price level for
the industry. In addition, firms can use information about sales volume,
which would indicate an unusual increase in one firm's sales (presuma-
bly associated with secret discounts), to monitor adherence to consensus
prices. For purposes of accomplishing the oligopoly tasks, the exchange
of information need not be symmetrical. That is, the oligopolists may
benefit as a group even if only some firms unilaterally- provide informa-
tion about their own activities.
One important note of caution must be sounded on the competitive
significance of information exchanges. Where market structure and
other complicating factors are not conducive to oligopoly pricing, each
firm's knowledge of the others' prices can improve the market. Perfect
information on behalf of sellers as well as buyers is a condition for the
economist's ideal of perfect competition; thus, information exchanges
are not necessarily undesirable.4 5
(iii) Geographic Pricng Formulas. Complications arise when custom-
43 For a description of one such episode, see F. SCHERER, .supra note 12, at 177-78.
44 A data exchange probably develops because the information is not otherwise avail-
able. An exchange, however, could develop as a more efficient mechanism for obtaining data
that could be obtained independently. For example, supermarket chains may exchange com-
puter printouts, perhaps through an intermediary, that contain the week's actual prices for
every item in each chain's stores. Presumably, each firm could independently obtain the in-
formation, although at greater cost and possibly greater risk of error.
45 See Posner, Information and Antitrust: Resections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decirions,
67 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1193-97 (1979).
[Vol. 67:439
OLIGOPOLY AND ANTITRUST
ers and suppliers are geographically dispersed and shipping costs are a
nontrivial percentage of production costs. The buyer is interested in the
delivered price regardless of who, buyer or seller, actually pays for ship-
ping. This creates two fundamental problems for an oligopoly seeking
to avoid price competition. First, even if one firm is aware of another's
announced price at the factory door, it would not know the rival's deliv-
ered price to a given customer unless it also knew the applicable ship-
ping charges. Therefore, matching a rival's delivered price would be
difficult. Second, in general, the rival's delivered price would be differ-
ent for each customer. Thus, the first firm would need to make not one
adjustment in its own effective price, but one for each customer, to
match its rivals' prices across the board.
Both these problems can be ameliorated if each rival adopts some
form of a delivered price system in which the announced price includes
shipping.46 The delivered price system could be simplified further by
establishing a small number of delivery zones or, in the extreme, only a
single nationwide zone within which the delivered price is uniform. In
the latter case, each firm has only a single delivered price for all custom-
ers, and matching prices is relatively easy for rivals. 47
(iv) Price Protection or Most-Favored-Customer Clause. A customer
with a price protection or most-favored-customer clause typically is
guaranteed that it will receive the lowest price granted to any customer.
This provision may even be retroactive; a customer who pays list price
today may receive a rebate if another customer is offered a lower price
within a specified future period. Risk-averse buyers may seek such
clauses because they protect such firms from their inability to bargain as
effectively as their own rivals. The clause might also benefit regulated
public utilities because it may reduce the prospect of a confrontation
with a rate commission that has learned that another utility has ob-
tained a piece of equipment at a better price. Hence, it is not surprising
to find that in bargaining between customer and supplier a most-fa-
vored-customer clause sometimes emerges as part of the contract.
Most-favored-customer clauses also penalize the firm that cuts
prices, thereby reducing the incentive to cut prices. This explains why
sellers like to see most-favored-customer clauses established as an indus-
try-wide practice. A firm contemplating a selective secret price cut
aimed at picking up additional sales would accept a price somewhat
lower than the "industry optimal" price, but would expect to profit
from the margin on the additional sales made as a result of the cut. If
retaliation is not expected to be forthcoming quickly, the temptation
may be irresistable. With a most-favored-customer clause, however, the
46 See Note, Conscious Parallelism in the Use of Delivered Pricing Systems: A Modified Per Se
Standard of Review Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1194 (1981).
47 See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
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calculus is dramatically altered. The price-cutting firm still makes the
additional sales, but gives up the higher margin on sales that it could
have made at the higher price. With the retroactive clause, it gives up
the extra margin it has already received on all sales during, for example,
the previous six months. Even without the threat of retaliation, these
considerations alone may be sufficient to render price cutting
unprofitable.
This explains why oligopolists like to see most-favored-customer
clauses in other sellers' contracts. Why, however, would a firm ever enter
into one with its own customers?48 The second of the two oligopoly
tasks-the establishment of mutual confidence of adherence to the oli-
gopoly price-suggests an answer. The firm may have no intention of
being the first to cut prices, but may find it difficult to persuade its rivals
that its intentions are sincere. Such persuasion may be critical lest the
rivals launch a preemptive price cut, not out of their own greed, but out
of fear that the first firm cannot be trusted. By voluntarily entering into
a most-favored-customer clause, the first firm constrains its own future
actions, thereby effectively persuading its rivals that it will not initiate a
price cut, and establishing the mutual confidence necessary to launch a
period of noncompetitive pricing.
c. The Nature of Agreement Under Indirect Collusion. These examples
of indirect collusion do not involve face-to-face communication. Each,
however, involves a specific, arguably avoidable, act. In that respect the
practices resemble formal collusion, where specific, avoidable acts are
likewise at issue more than where successful noncompetitive pricing is
achieved through pure oligopolistic interdependence.
A possible distinction between formal and indirect collusion is that
the former involves agreement. 49 In one sense of the word-implying a
binding contract-most instances of formal collusion would not qual-
ify.50 On the other hand, if "agreement" means simply a "meeting of
the minds" or a "mutual intent to follow a common course of action,"
even pure oligopolistic interdependence appears to qualify.
Implementing a noncompetitive price in an oligopoly framework
requires establishing a common "mental state" with mutual awareness
of the consensus industry price and mutual confidence that all firms will
adhere to that price.5 1 Whether formal collusion is necessary to produce
that mental state depends on the complicating factors present. 52 Where
48 Competitive pressure from customers may force firms to include such a clause. This is
less likely to be the case for the first firm to offer such a clause.
49 See Turner, supra note 4, at 663-65.
50 See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
51 These are the two basic tasks of the oligopolists. See notes 12-14 and accompanying
text supra.
52 If conditions are particularly unfavorable, even formal collusion may be insufficient
to achieve noncompetitive pricing.
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conditions are extremely favorable, no overt acts are required to pro-
duce the requisite mental state, and a noncompetitive price is estab-
lished and maintained solely by pure oligopolistic interdependence. No
less a meeting of the minds exists when duopolists, with identical costs
and an openly sold standard product, select the identical list price and
recognize the folly of price cutting, than when twenty manufacturers
with widely differing costs producing a differentiated product sold
secretly to sophisticated buyers "agree" in a hotel room to charge an
identical price.
II
APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL IN THE CONTEXT
OF FORMAL AGREEMENT
An economic model of oligopolistic behavior is of primary value
when there is no direct evidence of a formal agreement not to compete.5 3
This section uses the economic model developed in the preceding section
to explore two such situations. The first is when a plaintiff, while not
offering direct evidence of a formal agreement not to compete, asks the
court to infer the existence of such an agreement from circumstantial
evidence. The second situation involves a formal agreement to follow a
program of facilitating practices; examples include agreements among
competitors on a delivered price formula for quoting list prices, and
agreements to exchange certain kinds of information. This section does
not propose any changes in antitrust doctrine. Rather, it applies the
economic model to these situations to clarify the issues and to support a
finding of liability under proper facts.
A. Inferring Fomal Agreements
Where they are without direct evidence of a formal agreement,
courts may infer the existence of a formal agreement on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, some of which is economic in character. The
textbook case in this category is Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,54 in
which a group of film distributors simultaneously pledged not to deal
with a class of theaters except on certain terms. These terms included a
minimum admission price for "feature" films on subsequent runs, and a
prohibition against offering two "feature" films as a double feature. The
53 Where there is direct evidence of an agreement not to compete, a court does not need
to engage in a sophisticated economic analysis to determine the presence of an agreement or,
under the per se rule, to determine the extent to which the agreement restrains trade. Some
economic theory may be employed in the damages phase of the case where a need exists to
establish what the price would have been "but for" the conspiracy. See E. TIMBERLAKE,
FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS § 21 (1965); Parker, Measuring Damages in
Federal Treble Damage Actions, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 497 (1972).
54 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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pledge came in the form of parallel agreements between each of the
distributors and Interstate, a chain of first-run theaters.55
The decision turned on whether the distributors had actually
agreed among themselves to impose restrictions on the subsequent-run
exhibitors.56 The government produced no direct testimonial evidence
of such an agreement. Instead, the government relied on "inferences
drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators" to estab-
lish the existence of an agreement. 5 7 The trial court, apparently finding
a formal agreement, cited "the nature of the proposals made [by Inter-
state];. . . the manner in which they were made;. . . [and] the substan-
tial unanimity of action taken [on the proposals] by the distributors"5 8
as factors supporting its conclusion.
The economic model developed previously suggests a method of or-
ganizing the data to determine whether an inference of formal conspir-
acy is warranted in similar cases. Initially, the court must ask whether
the end result differs from what would be expected in a competitive
industry as a result of the basic forces of supply and demand.5 9 In a case
in which prices are at issue, the focus might be on the absolute level of
prices or profits, the recent movement of prices compared with cost
changes, or the presence of identical sealed bids. In Interstate Circuit, the
trial court remarked that the proposed restrictions constituted an impor-
tant departure from prior practice, involving a drastic increase in admis-
sion prices for the subsequent-run theatres.6 0  The Supreme Court
concurred with the trial court's conclusion that such a dramatic shift
55 This case differs from the traditional price-fixing case because Interstate, not the film
distributors, appeared to be the main beneficiary. Fewer theatergoers would be willing to
avoid Interstate's first-run prices by waiting to see a "feature" film on a subsequent run. The
distributors' participation in the contracts stemmed from Interstate's monopoly position in
several cities and its presumed power not to deal with any distributor who failed to adhere to
Interstate's wishes. Another unique aspect of this case is that each of the contracts between
Interstate and a film distributor might individually violate § 1 of the Sherman Act as an
agreement to impose onerous terms on third parties. Se Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
56 306 U.S. at 221.
57 Id.
58 Id. The Court also noted the failure of the defendants to "call as witnesses any of the
superior officials who negotiated the contracts with Interstate or any official who, in the nor-
mal course of business, would have had knowledge of the existence or non-existence ofsuch an
agreement among the distributors." Id.
59 A variant of the question is to ask whether the observed behavior was individually
rational; would the firm have followed the same course of action absent any confidence that
rivals would behave similarly? This variant is problematic, however, when events have an
industry-wide impact. If, for example, the wholesale price of canned tomatoes increases by
$.10, a grocer in a competitive environment will pass the increase along in his retail price;
otherwise, he will be selling below costs. He also knows that his rivals are experiencing the
same cost pressures. Hence, the question of what he would do if he did not expect rivals to
behave similarly is not meaningful.
60 United States v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 868, 872 (N.D. Tex. 1937), afd,
306 I.S. 208 (1939).
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could not have been the result of independent, competitive behavior.61
Even if the end result is not what would be expected in a competi-
tive environment, the inquiry is not over, because there may be several
possible explanations for the result. Formal collusion is one possibility;
pure oligopoly interdependence is another. To distinguish among these
and other possibilities, the economic model suggests a question related
to the two oligopoly tasks: what enabled and motivated each firm to
follow the same course of action?
The Court in Interstate Circuit noted that all of the distributors had
adopted substantially identical plans at about the same time, even
though the plans were a radical departure from prior practice.62 It
seems unlikely that identical contracts could have emerged as the result
of the distributors having reacted simultaneously to the same cost and
demand pressures. In addition, given that the contracts were private
agreements between Interstate and each of several distributors, the par-
allel conduct cannot be attributed to the kind of price leadership that is
observed when one supermarket posts a higher price for canned toma-
toes and others match it.
Following this reasoning, the Court intially seems to have relied on
a "facilitating practices" theory to explain the unanimity of action. In-
terstate's proposal to each of the distributors was contained in a letter
that "named on its face as addressees the eight local representatives of
the distributors, and so from the beginning each of the distributors knew
that the proposals were under consideration by the others."' 63 The
Court also noted that the unanimous action created "the prospect of
increased profits."'64
Partly because the contracts ultimately signed by each of the dis-
tributors, while substantially identical to one another, were different
from the original proposal, the Court appears to have rejected the the-
ory that the simultaneous invitations could have been the entire expla-
nation. The Court also emphasized the need for mutual confidence that
all distributors would go along.6 5 In upholding the trial court's appar-
61 306 U.S. at 223.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 222.
64 Id.
65 "Each was aware that all were in active competition and that without substantially
unanimous action with respect to the restrictions for any given territory there was risk of a
substantial loss of the business and good will of the subsequent-run and independent exhibi-
tors. . . . [t]here was risk, too, that without agreement diversity of action would follow." Id.
The risk of non-unanimous action in the Interstate situation apparently stemmed not from
the individual incentive of distributors to cheat by not signing the contract with Interstate,
but from the possibility that diversity of action would occur through an inability to coordi-
nate. The incentive deliberately to deviate was mitigated by the risk that Interstate, with a
first-run monopoly position in several cities, would refuse to show the films of a distributor
who did not sign.
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ent inference of formal collusion, the Court stated that it was unable to
find "any persuasive explanation, other than agreed concert of action,
[for] the singular unanimity of action on the part of the distributors. '66
The Court therefore concluded that a formal agreement enabled and
motivated the defendants to follow the same course of action.6 7
This discussion suggests two rather divergent defenses available in a
situation in which the plaintiff asks the court to infer formal collusion
from circumstantial evidence. The first is to argue that the behavior
was competitive. There is no need to inquire how a "meeting of the
minds" arose because none was necessary for the observed behavior to
occur. The behavior was independently rational and would have oc-
curred without any assurance that others would behave similarly.68
If this argument is unpersuasive, an alternative explanation is that
the parallel, allegedly noncompetitive result is the natural consequence
of oligopolistic interdependence given the industry setting. In effect, the
defendant is arguing that the behavior was individually profit-maximiz-
ing given the likely reaction of its rivals.69 This defense would be most
66 Id. at 223.
67 Although the Court apparently concluded that formal agreement had occurred, it
suggested its likely receptiveness to an indirect collusion approach:
While the District Court's finding of an agreement of the distributors among
themselves is supported by the evidence, we think that in the circumstances of
this case such agreement for the imposition of the restrictions upon subse-
quent-run exhibitors was not a prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy. It was
enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited,
the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in
it . . .
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed with-
out simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators ....
Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to
participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is
restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspir-
acy under the Sherman Act ....
Id. at 226-27.
68 Firms might be assured that rivals will act similarly because all are subject to the
same market forces, and any firm that acted differently would reduce, not increase, its profits.
See note 58 supra. Individual compulsion, however, not the assurance of parallel action, is the
primary force leading to the observed pattern of behavior.
69 A plaintiff's argument that a firm's behavior was inconsistent with its own self-interest
proves nothing other than, perhaps, the irrationality of the firm's management. The plaintiff
must argue that the firm's behavior was inconsistent with its own self-interest unless it ob-
tained assurances that its rivals would behave similarly. In the defense suggested here, the
defendant agrees with the plaintiff's argument but asserts that the assurance need not have
stemmed from formal agreement.
For an example of the problem of relying on notions of individual self-interest in an
oligopolistic context, see Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951), cer. denied,
343 U.S. 929 (1952) ("Each distributor has thus acted in apparent contradiction to its own
self-interest. This strengthens considerably the inference of conspiracy, for the conduct of the
distributors is, in the absence of a valid explanation, inconsistent with decisions indepen-
dently arrived at."). The court apparently ruled out the possibility that the defendant knew,
from industry structure, that its actions would be matched by rivals, and that in this event
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plausible when concentration is extremely high, the product is simple
and homogeneous, and sales are both open and continuous. 70
Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,7  which is
often cited in support of the argument that parallel conduct stemming
from oligopolistic interdependence does not violate the Sherman Act,
demonstrates the differences between the two defenses. In a famous dic-
tum, the Court noted that "[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously par-
allel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial
attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely. ' 72 Because "conscious par-
allelism" is often used interchangeably with "oligopolistic interdepen-
dence" in the economics literature, Theatre Enterprises traditionally has
been viewed as an example of the second defense. The facts of the case,
however, suggest that the Court may have had the first defense in mind.
In Theatre Enterprises, plaintiffs argued that the parallel action of a
number of film distributors in refusing to give first-run films to a partic-
ular suburban Baltimore theater was the result of a conspiracy among
the distributors. The Supreme Court determined that each distributor
may have had an independent reason to behave as it did, implying that
each distributor would have acted in the same way regardless of what its
rivals did.73 The distributors may not have been aware of one another's
parallel conduct and, more importantly, even if they were aware, it
made no difference. This type of behavior is competitive, not oligopolis-
tic; thus, no basis exists for an inference of formal collusion.
B. Formal Agreements that are not Facially Anticompetitive
The typical cartel arrangement is manifested in an agreement not
to compete. Frequently this involves agreements to use a uniform price
or to allocate customers or territories. 74 Where the agreement is other
than a naked covenant not to compete, economic analysis may be help-
ful in determining its likely impact on competition. Two classic catego-
any alternative strategy would be less profitable. Courts' failure to recognize this alternative
possibility may lead to improper analysis of self-interest.
70 If the industry structure was more complicated, the only reasonable inferences would
be that formal collusion, or at least indirect collusion, had occurred. See notes 20-24, 34-48
and accompanying text supra. The value to the plaintiff or the defendant in pointing to
indirect collusion as a possible explanation obviously depends on the legal status of that cate-
gory of behavior.
71 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
72 Id. at 541 (footnote omitted).
73 Id. at 541-42.
74 Occasionally the agreement does not directly govern prices or allocate customers, but
the impact on competition is so obvious that the court requires little economic analysis to
condemn the arrangement. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940) (agreement among major gasoline refiners to purchase excess gasoline output of in-
dependent refiners that otherwise would depress market price of gasoline).
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ries of agreement that can be examined in this light are agreements to
use a particular pricing formula and agreements to exchange certain
kinds of transactions data. 75
1. Delivered Price Formulas
As indicated above,76 an oligopoly seeking to avoid price competi-
tion faces a complication when customers and suppliers are geographi-
cally dispersed, because a different delivered price exists for each
customer from any given supplier. Thus, even if one firm knows its ri-
val's mill price, it may not be able to match the delivered price to a
given customer unless it knows the relevant shipping costs from the ri-
val's plant to that customer. This matching problem is simplified if
firms adopt a convention that the list price to a given customer will be
the price at the plant plus some readily ascertainable shipping charge-
the published rail tariff from the nearest producer's plant to the cus-
tomer, for example. 77
The agreement to use a particular pricing system does not, by itself,
necessarily affect the incentive or the ability of firms to cheat by under-
cutting the list price determined under the pricing formula. Hence de-
livered pricing, by itself, may not contribute to the second of the
oligopoly tasks, just as a hotel-room agreement to fix a specific price does
not necessarily prevent or reduce cheating. It does, however, simplify
the process of establishing a consensus price. In this respect, use of a
delivered price formula accomplishes what could be accomplished in ho-
tel-room meetings. The other task, confidence in adherence to the con-
sensus price, must be achieved through oligopolistic interdependence or
other means. 78
At least two potentially adverse effects follow from a delivered price
system. First, assuming adherence to the system, any. given firm locks
itself into a particular geographic pricing pattern for its own customers.
Customers near the firm's plant may not receive any reduction in price
reflecting the lower transport costs of serving them.79 Second, the com-
75 Both categories have been examined extensively in the literature; only limited com-
mentary is required here. On delivered pricing systems, see Kaysen, Basing Point Pricing and
PublicPoliq, 63 Q.J. ECON. 289 (1949); Note, supra note 46; Comment, Pice Systems and Compe-
tition." The Basing Point Issues, 58 YALE L.J. 426 (1949). On information exchanges, see Stock-
ing, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and the Legality of Trade Association Activities, 21 U.
CHI. L. REv. 527 (1954); Note, Antitrust Liability For An Exchange of Price Information-What
Happened to Container Corporation, 63 VA. L. REv. 639 (1977).
76 See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
77 An extension of the agreement is to distribute the appropriate shipping rates to all
firms to eliminate any uncertainty or error regarding a specific rate.
78 Indeed, the delivered price system also might be used in conjunction with a more
formal cartel to simplify the task of promoting mutual confidence in adherence to the consen-
sus price.
79 Under uniform delivered prices, for example, all customers are effectively charged the
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mon use of a delivered price system can facilitate oligopolistic pricing
even where no formal agreement exists on the actual price quoted to
customers.
Even though an adverse effect is not inevitable,8 0 courts may prop-
erly adopt a per se treatment of formal agreements to use a delivered
price system. If there are competitive benefits to the use of a delivered
price system, these benefits can be obtained without an agreement; in-
deed, an incentive exists for unilateral action to employ it. In addition,
because an agreement may and frequently will give rise to competitive
harm, the calculus is clearly on the side of per se prohibition. In short,
problems of measuring performance, establishing the precise impact of
the practice on performance, and assessing possible competitive benefits
from the practice are largely circumvented in the case of a formal agree-
ment to use a particular delivered price system.
2. Information Exchange Agreements
Information exchange agreements can involve many kinds of data,
typically an agreement to exchange recent price quotations or sales
quantities with varying degrees of formality.81 The efficacy of such in-
formation in facilitating oligopolistic pricing must be examined in light
of the tasks to be accomplished and the complicating factors pertinent to
the industry.
Information exchange can contribute to either of the two oligopoly
tasks. Data on recent prices charged by industry leaders can serve to
communicate to other rivals that some movement in the price of the
leaders has occurred and thereby permit the recipients of this informa-
tion to follow, albeit with more of a lag than had face-to-face discussions
occurred. If prices are communicated before they go into effect, this
method may be nearly as efficient as direct collusion. Rivals may re-
spond and thereby signal the price leader that they have ratified its re-
cent price move. This offers the leader greater assurance that it will not
be alone in raising list prices and thereby reduces the leader's risk in
initiating a price increase.82
Exchange of actual invoices or data on sales volume provides a
check on adherence to list prices, because rivals can monitor one an-
same amount for transportation, which is incorporated into the uniform price. In some bas-
ing-point systems, nearby customers may pay even more than a more distant customer if the
plant of the producer in question is not a basing point. See F. SCHERER, supra note 11, at 325-
29.
80 Oligopolistic pricing is not inevitable; structural conditions may make oligopolistic
pricing impossible. See notes 19-32 and accompanying text supra.
81 The data exchanged could consist of actual invoices, a computerized list of prices, or
simply an acknowledgment of discount offers.
82 See notes 17, 41-43 and accompanying text supra. For a more detailed discussion of
this effect in practice, see notes 127-31 and accompanying text infra.
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other's actual prices or detect any unusual growth in volume that would
raise inferences of price shading.83 The availability of this check in-
creases the level of confidence in adherence and makes an increase in list
prices or matching a rival's increase less risky.8 4
Application of the per se approach to information exchange agree-
ments is more problematical than its application to delivered price sys-
tems. Information exchanges may have a procompetitive effect because
they provide firms with a more complete understanding of market con-
ditions.85 These benefits, unlike those flowing from pricing formulas,
may not be achieved easily through unilateral action. Absent an agree-
ment requiring a contribution of information as a quid pro quo for re-
ceiving the comparable information about competitors, an obvious
incentive exists for a firm to behave as a "free rider" and not contribute
any information about itself.
Because a program of information dissemination will likely require
some tacit or explicit agreement, a complete prohibition of such agree-
ments under a per se rule means that any possible benefits from such a
program will almost certainly go unrealized. Although empirical evi-
dence quantifying such benefits is virtually nonexistent, court decisions
and scholarly writing suggest that, at least in the context of an otherwise
competitive industry, such benefits may be significant. 86
The possibility of significant benefits from information exchanges
suggests that a flat prohibition is unwise; yet a full rule of reason ap-
proach might put the courts in the unenviable position of having to
quantify and compare the benefits and costs to competition. An alter-
native suggested by Justice Fortas's concurring opinion in United States v.
Container Corp. 8 7 is a modified per se approach, under which the agree-
83 There is no guarantee that the invoices or other information have not been
fabricated; even formal cartels rely to some degree on "honor among thieves." See notes 33-34
and accompanying text supra.
84 For any of these measures to succeed, the structural features of the industry must be
at least mildly favorable. See notes 19-32, 40 and accompanying text supra. For example, even
the most formal and extensive data exchange would probably not have an anticompetitive
impact in a very unconcentrated industry.
85 See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
86 See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting):
I should have thought that the ideal of commerce was an intelligent in-
terchange made with full knowledge of the facts as a basis for a forecast of the
future on both sides. A combination to get and distribute such knowledge,
notwithstanding its tendency to equalize, not necessarily to raise, prices, is
very far from a combination in unreasonable restraint of trade.
See also Posner, supra note 45, at 1193-97.
87 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
I do not understand the Court's opinion to hold that the exchange of specific
information among sellers as to prices charged to individual customers, pursu-
ant to mutual arrangement, is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. ...
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ment is per se illegal in the presence of certain structural conditions.88
The general approach is fully compatible with the earlier discussion of
complicating factors.89 One would expect high concentration, relatively
simple and homogeneous products, and relatively smooth sales to be
necessary conditions90 for an anticompetitive impact to emerge.
III
APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL WHEN No
FORMAL AGREEMENT EXISTS
B. Tacit Agreement As Illegal Conduct
When the end result seems inconsistent with vigorous competition,
yet a formal agreement cannot be demonstrated either by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence, the problems in articulating a coherent basis for
antitrust liability become substantially more complex. Courts' efforts to
deal with this category have, for the most part, centered on a notion of
"tacit" or "implicit" agreement. These efforts have been largely unsuc-
cessful, producing a confused series of opinions that provide little gui-
dance on when antitrust liability will be found.
A basic reason for this lack of success is the courts' failure to link
legal notions of culpability with a relevant economic model of oligopoly
behavior. This section demonstrates the fundamental weakness in the
concept of a tacit agreement as a basis for antitrust liability. An alterna-
tive legal argument based on the economic model is developed, permit-
ting a clearer and more principled basis for distinguishing culpable from
lawful behavior.
When no formal agreement exists, yet an industry's performance is
inconsistent with vigorous competition, the economic model suggests
two possible explanations. First, firms may have employed facilitating
[The] evidence, although not overwhelming, is sufficient in the special cir-
cumstances of this case to show an actual effect on pricing....
Id. at 338-39 (Fortas, J., concurring). For a differing characterization of the government's
evidence, see United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 340-47 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). One commentator has decried the failure of lower courts to follow Container's
approach to information exchanges. See Note, supra note 75, at 667.
One commentator has argued for the adoption of a modified per se approach with re-
gard to the consciously parallel use of delivered pricing systems. See Note, supra note 46, at
1194. Of course, where the avowed purpose of the agreement is to suppress competition, the
usual per se approach will be followed. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940).
88 393 U.S. at 338-40. Some of the structural conditions emphasized, such as low entry
barriers, seem at odds with the possibility of successful oligopoly pricing for any sustained
period. See id. at 339-40.
89 See notes 19-32 and accompanying text supra.
90 Open sales are not included as a factor because, typically, the anticompetitive impact
of an information exchange is to convert what would have been secret transactions into open
sales in the sense that sellers, although not necessarily customers, become well informed about
rivals' prices.
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practices, adopted without formal agreement, that make it possible to
achieve a noncompetitive outcome without direct collusion. Second,
under the most favorable structural conditions, the outcome could re-
sult from pure oligopolistic interdependence. Under either explanation,
a meeting of the minds can fairly be said to exist, because a meeting of
the minds is a necessary condition for the performance to be
noncompetitive.
Courts' principal efforts to deal with this overall category have not
appreciated these alternative explanations. Courts have imposed anti-
trust liability on a subset of these situations based on the notion of tacit
or implicit agreement. The issue to be resolved, however, is whether
"tacit agreement" for section 1 purposes includes the kind of meeting of
the minds that can arise solely from oligopolistic structure.9' If "meet-
ing of the minds" is synonymous with "agreement," then every noncom-
petitive outcome involves agreement, and antitrust liability could follow
from every finding of a noncompetitive outcome. Although there is
nothing conceptually repugnant in labeling such perceived interdepen-
dence as a "meeting of the minds" implying the presence of an agree-
ment, major equitable and practical concerns arise when section 1
liability is attached to behavior that is not plausibly avoidable.92
But if the concept of tacit agreement does not extend to this kind of
oligopolistic coordination, what, if anything, does it include? Courts
sometimes characterize the additional types of circumstantial evidence
they seek in conscious parallelism cases as "plus factors."'93 Analysis of
two of the most commonly used "plus factors" suggests that they do
nothing to clarify the proper legal standard. The first such factor is evi-
dence suggesting that the result can be explained only as the outcome of
a formal conspiracy. This kind of evidence would rule out not only
competitive or independent behavior, but also indirect collusion and
pure oligopolistic interdependence. 94 The second kind of "plus factor"
is evidence showing that the result cannot be explained by independent
motivation. This might include evidence of poor performance or evi-
dence of "aberrant" behavior, such as identical prices in a sealed bid
auction, or more generally, evidence that the behavior would not be
rational unless all firms behaved similarly. "Plus factor" analysis, there-
91 The definition of agreement as an offer and acceptance provides a basis for categori-
zation. The analysis is not advanced, however, without a clear understanding of what consti-
tutes offer and acceptance. "Offer and acceptance" can be defined as requiring direct
communication or formal exchange. This definition would be reasonably unambiguous, but
would certainly omit a large number of situations in contract as well as antitrust law that
even traditionalists would want to describe as agreement.
92 See note 12 and accompanying text supra. Even greater problems would arise in fash-
ioning the relief to be granted in such a situation.
93 P. AREEDA, supra note 5, at 373.
94 For a discussion of the nature of this evidence, see note 66 and accompanying text
-upra.
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fore, serves to eliminate the spurious parallelism cases-parallelism that
is merely the result of all firms reacting independently to the same com-
petitive forces-but leaves formal collusion, informal collusion, and pure
oligopolistic interdependence as possibilities. In neither case does the
"plus factor" separate out conduct that should survive antitrust
scrutiny.
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp. 95 demonstrates that efforts to resolve this
problem have not been successful. In Bogosian, a number of oil compa-
nies that supplied a group of service stations required that each service
station operator sell the gasoline only of the oil company whose trade-
mark the service station carried. The district court granted summary
judgment for most of the defendant oil companies "because it concluded
that the allegation of 'interdependent consciously parallel action' in a
complaint is an insufficient statement of the concerted action necessary
to state a claim under § 1."96
The appellate court reversed, neatly sidestepping the main issue.
The court required plaintiffs to show at least that the parallel behavior
cannot be explained entirely by independent business motivation. 97 If
independent business reasons can explain the behavior, however, no
"meeting of the minds" is necessary and no basis exists for an inference
of collusion, whether formal98 or informal. Nor is the result attributable
to oligopolistic interdependence; each firm would have behaved the
same way regardless of how it anticipated its rivals would behave. The
decision is silent on what more, if anything, the plaintiff must establish,
or whether parallel action resulting from pure oligopolistic interdepen-
dence is adequate for liability under the Sherman Act. 99
95 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
96 Id. at 440.
97 The law is settled that proof of consciously parallel business behavior is cir-
cumstantial evidence from which an agreement, tacit or express, can be in-
ferred but that such evidence, without more, is insufficient unless the
circumstances under which it occurred make the inference of rational in-
dependent choice less attractive than that of concerted action ...
We recently articulated those circumstances in Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Products, Co.,
521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir. 1975):
"(1) a showing of acts by defendants in contradiction of their own economic
interests. . .; and (2) satisfactory demonstration of a motivation to enter an
agreement.
Id. at 1314 (citation omitted). Id. at 446.
98 If hard evidence of formal collusion exists, the fact that independent decisionmaking
could have produced the same outcome would not be a permissible defense.
99 Plaintiffs also contend that even if their complaints are construed not to allege
a combination, that an allegation of interdependent consciously parallel ac-
tion states a § 1 claim. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants offer a definition of
interdependence, however. A situation of interdependence has been said to
exist when, in a highly concentrated market, there is an awareness that, be-
cause of the limited number of sellers, any variation in price or price-related
structures will necessarily have a demonstrable effect on the sales of others
such that each firm bases its decisions, at least in part, on the anticipated
1982]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:439
A. Indirect Collusion As Illegal Conduct
The economic model developed in the previous sections can be used
to fashion a procedure for distinguishing culpable from nonculpable be-
havior under antitrust analysis. This Article argues that indirect collu-
sion is not fundamentally different from direct collusion and that firms
engaging in indirect collusion through a program of facilitating prac-
tices should face antitrust liability. 00
The problem of a culpable acts requirement does not exist for the
practices labeled "indirect collusion." In such cases, the defendants
have taken specific avoidable acts that produce a consensus on the price
to be charged and mutual confidence that rivals will adhere to that
price. These practices, like formal collusion, establish the meeting of the
minds that makes it individually rational for each firm to behave in a
parallel noncompetitive way. The combination of a meeting of the
minds and culpable acts leading to a consensus provides a coherent basis
reactions of the others to its initiative .... There is a lively debate, however,
concerning the relationship of interdependence to collusion .... If these the-
ories are to be tested, it should be done on a fully developed factual record
which probes the conflicting economic facts on which they are premised. The
complaint is much too blunt an instrument with which to forge fundamental
policies regarding the meaning of competition in concentrated indus-
tries .... We conclude that the ruling that the specific allegation of interde-
pendent consciously parallel action made here fails to state a claim should be
vacated so that the issue can be decided, if necessary, after the relevant facts
are fully developed.
561 F.2d at 446-47.
The dissenting judge would have preferred to decide the policy issue, asserting that "an
allegation of consciously parallel behavior without more, would not state a Sherman Act
claim." Id. at 457. The "more" he would require seems to be at least that the behavior
cannot be explained as the result of independent motivation. Id. at 458 (Aldisert, J., dissent-
ing). This additional requirement is fully compatible with the majority opinion. The dissent,
however, is equally unclear about whether some additional proof is required. A strong indi-
cation exists that pure oligopolistic interdependence would not be enough:
In a concentrated industry, such mutually conscious and interdependent con-
duct by several competitors may have anticompetitive effects. But it is not
necessarily collusive, and I cannot understand how a proliferation of descrip-
tive words changes the legal status of the conduct. Until there is a contract,
combination or conspiracy, in restraint of trade, there is no § 1 violation.
Id. at 459. The dissent negates the force of that comment shortly thereafter:
In their brief in this court, plaintiffs rely primarily on Wall Products Co. v. Na-
tional Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971), and Modern Home Institute,
Inc. v. HartfordAccident and Idemnity Co., 513 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1975). Based on
these decisions, they say "it is clear that [the courts] have uniformly held that
proof of interdependent conscious parallel action, while not conclusive proof
of a Section 1 Sherman Act violation, is sufficient to support a finding of
violation." Appellants' Brief at 21. In my view, it is not necessary to agree or
disagree with that reading of the cases in order to affirm the summary judg-
ment here.
Id. Commentators generally share the view that the issue is not clearly resolved. See, e.g., P.
AREEDA, supra note 5, at 371-73.
100 There are some important evidentiary issues, however, that may limit application of
the indirect collusion concept. See notes 134-38 and accompanying text infa.
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for making policy distinctions. Indeed, one could consider formal collu-
sion simply as one of many methods each potentially culpable by which
firms actively achieve a noncompetitive result. That the presence or ab-
sence of agreement, however defined, provides as clear a basis for such
distinctions is doubtful.
Although courts have not gone so far as to treat formal collusion as
a subset of a wider class of culpable behavior, courts occasionally suggest
that individual firm actions, short of formal collusion, can form the basis
for antitrust liability. 10 1 The Interstate Circuit Court identified the mul-
ticopy letter from the exhibitor to the various distributors as an act that
facilitated the distributors' parallel and anticompetitive conduct to-
wards the second-run theaters.10 2 The Court also seemed willing to base
a finding of unlawful agreement on the parallel conduct plus the letter.
Unfortunately for those seeking clear precedent in this area, the Court
apparently was convinced that some of the parallel conduct represented
such a substantial departure from the historical pattern that formal col-
lusion must have occurred following the receipt of the letter. 0 3
Aside from the dictum in Interstate Circuit, tentative support for an
indirect collusion theory of antitrust liability can be found in three ar-
eas. First, in the delivered pricing cases, the FTC has succeeded in es-
tablishing that firms engaging in a uniform system of delivered pricing
may violate the Federal Trade Commission Act without proof of agree-
ment. Second, the Justice Department's "shared monopoly" theory sug-
gests that section 1 liability might follow from parallel adoption of a
program of facilitating practices without proof of a formal agreement.
Finally, in In re Ethyl Corp.,104 the FTC used an indirect collusion theory
in arguing for liability under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
1. Delivered Pricing As a Facilitating Device
A formal agreement to use a particular pricing system, such as bas-
ing point or uniform delivered pricing, poses no serious analytical or
legal problems. 10 5 The classic cases condemning delivered pricing, how-
ever, did not involve evidence showing directly or indirectly that a for-
mal agreement had occurred. 10 6 The question then is whether the
parallel use of a particular delivered pricing system that leads to an an-
ticompetitive result violates the antitrust laws without a showing of
101 The Supreme Court once held the view that even pure oligopolistic interdependence
would serve as a basis for liability. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
808-15 (1946). This view no longer commands substantial support. See text accompanying
note 52 supra. The discussion here is confined to indirect collusion.
102 See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra.
103 306 U.S. at 222-25; see note 66 and accompanying text supra.
104 No. 9128 (F.T.C. Aug. 5, 1981).
105 See notes 76-80 and accompanying text supra.
106 See generally Note, supra note 46, at 1200-10.
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agreement. If so, the cases provide an excellent illustration of the indi-
rect collusion or facilitating practices approach.
FTC v. Cement Institute,°107 the first modern case of significance, in-
volved a basing point pricing system that permitted firms to quote iden-
tical prices to any given customer regardless of location, even in a sealed
bid context.'08  The FTC did not attempt to prove an agreement
among firms to use the basing point system. Instead, the FTC demon-
strated the existence of a combination to employ the basing point system
for the purpose of selling at identical prices. 10 9
The combination consisted not simply of the parallel use of a bas-
ing point system, but of "numerous concerted activities carried on in
order to make the multiple basing point system work in such way that
competition in quality, price and terms of sale of cement would be non-
existent . .. "110 These actions served as facilitating practices that cre-
ated mutual confidence in adherence to the pricing system.
It would not have been incompatible with prior cases to label these
collective activities as agreement. Indeed, while review of the FTC's or-
der was pending in the court of appeals, the Justice Department filed a
civil action alleging an agreement in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 1 ' In its opinion, the Supreme Court suggested its willingness
to consider an argument that indirect collusion involving individual, al-
beit parallel, conduct may fall within the scope of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 112 Given that the Court approved the FTC's finding
of concerted activity, however, it is difficult to be certain that the FTC
could prevail with such an approach.
The next delivered pricing case appears more directly relevant to
the "indirect collusion" approach. In T'angle Condui? & Cable Co. v.
FTC,13 the FTC, in its first count alleged a conspiracy among manufac-
turers of rigid steel conduit. 114 In a second count, however, the FTC
charged that the conduit sellers restrained price competition in violation
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act "'through their con-
107 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
108 For example, in 1936, 11 cement producers each bid $3.286854 per barrel for 6,000
barrels of cement. Id. at 713 n.15.
109 Id. at 688-89.
11o Id. at 709.
111 Id. at 693-94.
112 "[I]ndividual conduct, or concerted conduct, which falls short of being a Sherman
Act violation may as a matter of law constitute an 'unfair method of competition' prohibited
by the Trade Commission Act." Id. at 708.
113 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), a d by an equal' divided Court sub nom. Clayton Mark &
Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
114 Id. at 176. In commenting on this count, the Seventh Circuit noted that "the exist-
ence of a plan or method which equalizes the delivered costs or prices of competitors having
widely different freight costs to given destinations constitutes strong evidence in itself of an
agreement to use such plan or system." Id. at 179.
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current use of a formula method of making delivered price quotations
with the knowledge that each did likewise . . "'115 According to the
FTC, this practice deprived local customers of price advantages derived
from being close to the point of production and resulted in monopolistic
control over the price of rigid steel conduits.' 16 With respect to the sec-
ond count, the court observed that the use of the basing-point formula
allowed each conduit seller to quote identical delivered prices. This
practice required sellers systematically to increase or decrease their mill
net price for each customer to match their competitors' delivered prices.
In such a situation, therefore, each seller must consciously intend not to
exclude competitors from their natural freight advantage territory,
which "in effect invites the others to share the available business at
matched prices in his natural market in return for a reciprocal invita-
tion." 117 The Court concluded simply that "we cannot say that the
Commission was wrong in concluding that the individual use of the bas-
ing point method as here used does constitute an unfair method of
competition."" 8
The FTC originally interpreted this decision as giving it considera-
ble authority in conscious parallelism cases, but subsequently reversed
its position in the face of severe congressional opposition.119 For many
years thereafter it challenged the parallel use of delivered pricing only
when there was some evidence of collusion.120 In Boise Cascade Corp. v.
FTC,121 however, the FTC resurrected its view that parallel use of deliv-
ered pricing alone could violate section 5. The Ninth Circuit, declining
to enforce the FTC's order prohibiting the use of the delivered price
system, initially did little to clarify the issue of what must be proved to
establish a violation of section 5. Based on the existing case law and the
FTC's policy statement, the court concluded that "the bare existence of
an industry-wide artificial freight factor" was not enough to support a
finding of a section 5 violation. Rather, the court was "looking for at
least a tacit agreement" to use the formula.' 22 While the court declined
to identify precisely what it meant by tacit agreement, it subsequently
appeared to render the issue moot by holding
that in the absence of evidence of overt agreement to utilize a pricing
system to avoid price competition, the Commission must demonstrate
that the challenged pricing system has actually had the effect of fixing
115 Id. at 176.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 181.
118 Id.
119 Boise Cascade Corp. v. Federal Trade Commision, 637 F.2d 573 (9th. Oh-. 1980). See Note,
supra note 46, at 1207-08.
120 637 F.2d at 576.
121 Id. at 573.
122 Id. at 576-77.
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or stabilizing prices. Without such effect, a mere showing of parallel
action will not establish a section 5 violation.1
23
The Boise Cascade opinion indicates that parallel use of facilitating
practices such as a delivered pricing formula can be held to violate sec-
tion 5 without the need to allege an agreement, overt or tacit, so long as
an anticompetitive effect can be established. The only area of contro-
versy, and the reason the FTC failed to prevail in Boise Cascade, is that
an actual anticompetitive impact must be demonstrated.124 It appar-
ently will not suffice to show that, given the industry structure, an an-
ticompetitive impact is likely. Otherwise, the opinion seems unusally
favorable to an indirect collusion theory, at least in connection with sec-
tion 5.
2. Shared Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: The Turbine Generator
Investigation
The Justice Department's theory that behavior short of formal col-
lusion can trigger antitrust liability under the Sherman Act 2 5 was de-
veloped during the Department's investigation of the turbine generator
industry during the period 1963-1972.126 The government concluded
123 Id. at 577.
124 For a discussion of the impact of this requirement, see notes 134-38 and accompany-
ing text inra.
125 The government's theory came to be known as "shared monopoly." The term
"shared monopoly" has generated considerable confusion because it has been used to refer to
three rather different antitrust situations. Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner addressed the first
issue to which the term has been applied. Their concern was with oligopolistic industries that
could generate supra-competitive profits by pure oligopolistic interdependence and thereby
escape prosecution under all but the most liberal view of the antitrust laws. Their proposal,
adopted in the so-called "Neal Report" to President Johnson and later introduced as legisla-
tion by Senator Hart, called for a kind of "no-fault shared monopoly" whereby industries that
performed noncompetitively for an extended period could be dissolved to reduce concentra-
tion without any requirement of proving culpable conduct. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
supra note 2, at 111-18; REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POL-
Icy, at A-1 to A-1l (1968), reprinted in 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 11 (1968).
The second application of the phrase "shared monopoly" occurs in the context of the § 2
concept of "monopolizing." The issue here is how an oligopoly prevents new entry which
would undermine the "shared monopoly." This concept was applied in the Commission's
long-running case against the cereal manufacturers. This case involved some tactics allegedly
aimed at achieving noncompetitive prices, but the primary focus was on efforts to deter new
entry. The case recently was dismissed. See n re Kellogg Co., 1981 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
63,811 (Jan. 17, 1981).
The third application is the one developed in this Article under the name "indirect collu-
sion." The label "shared monopoly" was used by Attorney General Bell in his speech an-
nouncing a Justice Department program to search for situations of indirect collusion. In
retrospect, the choice of the label "shared monopoly" was unfortunate because it suggested
that the Department supported the no-fault oligopoly concept, an idea that has lost consider-
able support since the late 1960s, or the cereals-type approach, which never generated sub-
stantial enthusiasm. The Department's true aim was a behavior-oriented approach to
Sherman Act § 1 liability.
126 In 1976, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice concluded its investiga-
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that from mid-1963 onward, 127 price competition in the sale of turbine
generators had been virtually eliminated, but found no evidence of di-
rect communication between the two producers, General Electric (GE)
and Westinghouse. More than pure oligopolistic interdependence, how-
ever, was involved. The government identified certain facilitating prac-
tices employed in the industry that appeared to have been instrumental
in eliminating price competition.
These practices were contained in a pricing policy that GE initiated
in May 1963 and that Westinghouse effectively matched shortly thereaf-
ter. The new pricing strategy included a revision of the price book that
simplified procedures for pricing turbine generators; 128 use of a pub-
lished multiplier to reflect periodic changes in book prices; 129 a policy of
offering no individual discounts off book prices and introduction of a
price protection plan designed to implement the no-discount philoso-
phy; 130 and publication of outstanding orders and price quotations. 131
tion into pricing practices in the domestic steam turbine generator industry and prepared to
file a civil suit under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Prior to filing, the parties reached a settlement
involving substantial injunctive relief. The Department prepared a memorandum in which it
detailed its theory of the case and the reasons why it accepted the settlement in lieu of litiga-
tion. That public document forms the basis for this section of the Article, and many parts of
this section are taken directly from that document. Because the case was not litigated, the
"facts" used in this Article represent allegations that the government would have had to
prove at trial. For the government's memorandum and accompanying documents, see 42
Fed. Reg. 17,004 (1977).
127 During the 1950s an elaborate conspiracy involving the industry ended with the in-
dictment in 1960 of GE, Westinghouse, and Allis-Chalmers. Turbine generator prices, which
began a precipitous decline in 1958, continued to decline following the indictment. By De-
cember 1962, Allis-Chalmers had withdrawn from the market, but the industry continued to
be saddled with excess capacity and prices continued to decline during the first part of 1963.
Ste id. at 17,005-06.
128 Id. at 17,006. The revised price book employed various formulas that greatly simpli-
fied the pricing of the highly complex, customized machines and contained a series of pricing
examples that explained the use of the formulas. Virtually all of the pricing information
necessary to calculate the book price of any large turbine generator, and other terms and
conditions of sale, were included.
129 Id. To compute the actual price in effect at any given time, GE employed a pub-
lished multiplier. The multiplier was a percentage figure and applied to book prices. For
example, the price quoted to a customer in May 1963 was computed by multiplying the book
price by the multiplier of .76. The use of the multiplier permitted GE to make swift changes
in all of its prices inherent in printing an entirely new book, and reduced the risk of misinter-
pretation by Westinghouse.
130 Id. The price protection clause was introduced to deal with the problem of secret
discounts. In the event GE lowered prices for a particular customer, any buyer within the
previous six-month period could receive an identical discount retroactively. Customers would
be permitted to audit GE's books for sales in the six months subsequent to their own
purchase. Hence, GE could not employ selective price cuts without imposing a substantial
penalty upon itself. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
131 42 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (1977). At the time of an increase in the published multiplier,
GE published all of the orders it had received and the quotations it had made at the preexist-
ing price levels. Unless Westinghouse knew that a quote at the lower price level had been
made prior to the price increase, it would not know for certain whether GE had cheated on
the new price level.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The Justice Department concluded that these practices allowed GE
and Westinghouse to avoid price competition without the need for for-
mal collusion. Both oligopoly tasks had been satisfactorily accom-
plished. The consensus on the right price was achieved through GE's
"augmented" price leadership, including the price book, the simplified
pricing formulas, and the multiplier. GE's pricing strategy allowed
Westinghouse to ascertain the price GE would employ in any sales situa-
tion, thereby effectively removing a major source of uncertainty and a
major stumbling block in the industry's attempt to stabilize prices for
such a highly complex product. The price protection clause and the
publication of outstanding orders established mutual confidence that
both parties would adhere to the consensus price.
Although the Justice Department's articulation of how the facilitat-
ing practices contributed to the elimination of price competition com-
ports nicely with the approach developed in this Article, precisely how
the Justice Department would have articulated the reason why the be-
havior in question violated section 1 of the Sherman Act is not entirely
clear. No case was filed, 132 and the only reference to the legal theory
that the Department would have employed is contained in the introduc-
tory paragraphs of a memorandum the Department filed with the court.
Citing the absence of price competition in the industry, the parallel
adoption of the facilitating practices, and the defendants' alleged intent
to stabilize prices, the Department concluded that "this public exchange
of assurances, with such intent, did constitute an agreement to stabilize
prices which warranted the filing of a civil action . . . alleging a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. .... -133 Thus, although the narrative of the
memorandum is compatible with an "indirect collusion" approach, the
language speaks of the practices themselves as constituting an agree-
ment, presumably tacit, rather than facilitating an agreement.
The Department's mention of the parties' intent is interesting, al-
though it is unclear whether the Department believed that intent would
be a necessary ingredient in such a case. Apart from whether intent is
essential to the legal theory of the case, the government would clearly
have benefited from documentary evidence that the parties intended to
reduce price competition by implementing the new policies and believed
they had accomplished that result.
In particular, absent evidence of intent, the government might
have faced serious problems in convincing a court to condemn the par-
132 Because GE and Westinghouse offered to provide the desired relief and because of the
uniqueness of the case, no case was filed. Also, Westinghouse argued that the filing of an
antitrust suit would lead to numerous private treble damage actions and that such suits, plus
its liability arising out of the uranium supply contracts litigation, would possibly lead to
Westinghouse's departure from the turbine generator business. Id. at 17,009.
133 Id. at 17,006.
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ties' conduct under an indirect collusion or tacit agreement approach.
The government would have had to establish an impairment of price
competition attributable to the challenged practices. Moreover, to the
extent that Boise Cascade reflects how a court will treat cases involving an
alleged Sherman Act violation, 34 it suggests that in the absence of for-
mal collusion, evidence that poor performance is ikely to result from the
challenged practice will not suffice. Rather, it may be necessary to es-
tablish that the level of competition was deficient in some absolute
sense. 1
35
The government also might have to establish a link between the
proven poor performance and the practices cited in the complaint. Ab-
sent documentary evidence of the parties' perceptions about the likely or
actual impact of the practices, this too may pose a genuine problem.
Economics is not a laboratory science in which experiments can be per-
formed to sort out the independent effect of any given influence. In the
antitrust context, the government wants to determine how the industry
would have performed "but for" the cited practices. Unfortunately,
even if one could identify a period of time in which the practices were
not in use, normally other parameters affecting the industry will differ so
that it will be impossible to sort out the independent influence of the
challenged practices. 136
134 Boise Cascade involved a prosecution under the FTC Act. See notes 121-24 and accom-
panying text supra.
135 An economist is likely to evaluate the absolute level of performance in terms of exces-
sive price-cost margins or excessive profits. This gives rise to both data availability and data
interpretation problems. Cf. Kruse, Deconcentration and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200, 208 n.49 (1978) (discussing some difficulties in proving
anticompetitive effects in context of FTC's case against major cereal manufacturers). For a
typical multi-product firm, meaningful profit data may not be available for the product line
that is the focus of the complaint. Even where some statistics are available, they may not
properly measure what the economist seeks to measure-the difference between price and
long-run incremental cost. In any event, the data must be interpreted. To establish that
price is not equal to the relevant incremental cost will not suffice. Rather, the question about
the size of the margin or the level of profits is likely to be "relative to what?" Deriving and
defending the appropriate benchmark may prove a severe challenge.
More common in an antitrust context is an analysis of the dispersion of prices among
suppliers. In the GE matter the government believed that prices quoted by GE and Westing-
house were nearly always identical. In litigation, such a claim would inevitably generate
economic testimony by the defense that identical prices among suppliers are fully compatible
with perfect competition and are the norm in any market in which the product is fungible.
Given that prospect, the prospective defendants' admission that they believed the practices
had succeeded in eliminating competition would have provided a major advantage for the
government.
136 In the context of the turbine generator industry, the government might have com-
pared the absence of price competition after 1963 with the rampant discounting in the 196 1-
1963 period. Defendants might have countered by noting that demand stabilized after 1963
and that one of the three competitors had left the market, so that pure oligopolistic interde-
pendence in a two-firm industry might have yielded the same result. The documentary evi-
dence presumably reduced, if not totally eliminated, this burden for the government.
This problem is also present in determining damages in a traditional Sherman Act case.
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Finally, where the focus is not on a formal agreement to engage in
certain practices but on the parallel adoption of those practices, the gov-
ernment may have to balance the possible competitive benefits of those
practices with the previously "measured" costs. 137 Given the almost cer-
tain impossibility of measuring benefits and costs precisely, it is unclear
what rules of thumb courts will resort to where defendants claim that
certain practices reduce costs or otherwise convey some benefit to the
consumer. Where the government can establish that the practices were
undertaken for the purpose of reducing competition, courts can fairly
presume that no significant benefits will be foregone by their
prohibition. 138
3. Shared Monopol'y Under the FTC Act.- Ethvl
The latest and clearest use of the indirect collusion approach oc-
curred in the FTC's case against the four manufacturers of lead-based
antiknock additives.' 39 The FTC challenged three practices that it
claimed adversely affected competition: use of a uniform delivered pric-
ing system for quoting list prices, public announcement of list-price
changes in advance of the effective date, and use of a most-favored-cus-
tomer clause in contracts with individual customers. 140 The case is note-
worthy because complaint counsel did not allege any agreement, formal
or tacit. This provided a clear opportunity to establish what Cement In-
stitute,14 1 Triangle Conduit,142 and Boire Cascade143 had suggested-that
Cf. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 344, at 229 (1978) (In order to determine
damages "[a]fter an illegal price-fixing conspiracy, one would compare the agreed price or the
actual price resulting from an agreed formula or other misbehavior, with the price that would
have prevailed in the absence of the illegal conduct.') (footnote omitted). The courts have
responded to the empirical problem by imposing a looser standard for establishing damages
once the violation is established. See id. at 228. See also notes 146-58 and accompanying text
injfa (discussing this problem in connection with the Ethyl case).
137 See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
138 After the filing of the modified consent decree in GE-Westinghouse, the Antitrust
Division launched an extensive and well-publicized search for cases in which to employ the
facilitating practices approach. At this time the label "shared monopoly" was applied. See
Dep't ofJustice, Memorandum on Shared Monopolies (May 26, 1978), reprinted in 1978 ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 874, at F-I (July 27, 1978). Two years later, the effort
had not produced a single case. The evidentiary problems just discussed probably were a
factor in this failure. If proving that competition has been diminished by virtue of certain
practices is difficult when all discovery is completed, to find such a situation in the first place
using the usual investigative techniques must be even more difficult.
139 In re Ethyl Corp., No. 9128 (F.T.C. Aug. 5, 1981). The complaint parallels the lan-
guage of the government's memorandum in GE-Westinghouse. The author of this Article co-
authored the government's GE-Westinghouse memorandum and served as an expert witness
for the FTC in Ethyl. Hence, the relationship of the FTC theory to that developed here is not
coincidental.
140 Id. at 2.
141 333 U.S. 683 (1948); see notes 107-12 and accompanying text supra.
142 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), af'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Clayton Mark &
Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949). The appellate court opinion in Triangle Conduit was reason-
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parallel, 144 nonconspiratorial behavior could violate the FTC Act.
Complaint counsel achieved an initial victory in establishing that
an agreement in the traditional sense is not a necessary ingredient in
proving a case brought under the FTC Act. The Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) stated that section 5 can apply where
the activities violate the spirit of the Sherman Act, in particular Sec-
tion l's prohibition against conspiracies, contracts or combination in
restraint of trade. . . . [I]f the spirit of the Sherman Act is to prevent
activities in the marketplace which unreasonably restrict or foreclose
competition, that spirit may be violated whether such effect on com-
petition results from concerted or individual behavior.145
Although he stated that agreement was not a prerequisite to a finding of
liability on these facts, the ALJ did not define precisely the outer limits
of the FTC Act.
In addition to establishing the legal theory of the complaint, com-
plaint counsel was faced with three evidentiary tasks: to show (1) that
price competition was substantially attenuated; (2) that the result could
be traced in some significant degree to the challenged practices; and (3)
that any competitive benefits of the practices were less than the competi-
tive harm.' 46
Complaint counsel did not attempt to demonstrate "poor" per-
formance by establishing that prices and profits were too high in some
absolute sense. 147 Rather, complaint counsel focused on the lack of dis-
persion of prices-list prices were identical across firms and most sales
were at list. If list prices were equal to marginal costs, the lack of disper-
sion of actual prices would be consistent with vigorous competition in a
homogeneous product. Several indicia, however, including the "phan-
tom freight" paid by nearby customers under the uniform delivered
price system employed in the industry, suggested that list prices were
above long-run marginal cost. Thus, to the extent that any competitive
pressures existed, they should have manifested themselves in discounts
ably unambiguous, although that court also upheld the FTC's finding of an illegal agree-
ment. See notes 113-20 and accompanying text suipra. Subsequent FTC practice, however,
casts doubt on its confidence in the mandate implicit in Triangle Conduit. See notes 119-20 and
accompanying text supra.
143 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980); see notes 121-24 and accompanying text supra.
144 The degree of parallelism was not perfect. While all firms used a uniform delivered
pricing system, the use of public announcements of price changes and most-favored-customer
clauses varied over time and across firms. In re Ethyl Corp., No. 9128, slip op. at 50-59
(F.T.C. Aug. 5, 1981).
145 Id. at 129-30.
146 See also notes 75-90 and accompanying text supra (treatment of similar evidentiary
problems in the context of agreements to use delivered pricing and exchange information).
147 In its rebuttal case, the FTC successfully used respondents' data to establish that re-
turn on equity in this market was high relative to commonly-used benchmarks. In re Ethyl
Corp., No. 9128, slip op. at 136-37.
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from list prices. Widespread adherence to list prices that themselves ex-
ceed marginal costs suggests a lack of price competition, not an excess of
it. 148
Complaint counsel believed that the defendants' use of uniform de-
livered pricing and public announcement of price changes facilitated
this noncompetitive result by establishing a consensus on prices-the
first of the oligopoly tasks. They reasoned that use of uniform delivered
pricing made it easy for each firm to determine and match its rivals' list
price to any given customer.149 Given the wide dispersion in customer
locations, use of uniform delivered pricing meant that instead of each
firm having hundreds of effective list prices, depending in each case both
on the location of the seller's plant and the location of the buyer, the list
price for each seller consisted of a single number.
The public announcements of list-price changes' 50 reduced the un-
certainty facing a firm contemplating an increase in list prices by ensur-
ing that rivals would learn of the increase and have a chance to respond
before the price increase went into effect. The leader thus knew, before
its increase was effective, whether rivals would match the increase in list
prices.
The most-favored-customer clauses were cited as facilitating prac-
tices because of their tendency to encourage adherence to the stated list
prices. The clauses typically promised a customer that it could make its
purchases at the lowest price offered to any other customer.'-t Com-
plaint counsel argued that the clauses discouraged discounts from list
prices. 152 Moreover, the clauses reduced each firm's uncertainty about
whether its rival would be discounting. This made increasing list prices
and adhering to the established list price less risky.'
5 3
Denying that the facilitating practices caused the industry's unsatis-
factory performance, the defendants argued that any unsatisfactory per-
formance could be attributed to the structure of the industry along with
other elements beyond the sellers' control. They pointed to the small
number of firms and the fact that the product was perfectly fungible.
148 An important issue was how to treat nonprice competition. Firms occasionally "com-
peted" for business by various methods, such as providing certain services free of charge, some
of which came quite close to what economists would describe as price competition. The ALJ
refused to treat nonprice competition as an acceptable substitute for price competition and
indicated that the level of nonprice competition was symptomatic of the absence of price
competition. Id. at 140-41.
149 Id. at 149-52.
150 Typically, the price leader issued a press release at least 30 days in advance of the
effective date. Id. at 50-52, 93.
151 This differs from the price-protection clause at issue in GE-Westinghouse, because in
the Ethyl case no provision for a retroactive rebate existed. See note 130 and accompanying
text supra.
152 See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
153 In re Ethyl Corp., No. 9128, slip op. at 152-53 (F.T.C. Aug. 5, 1981).
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They also argued that buyers would inform rival sellers of any firm's
discount from the list price. Therefore, list prices would tend to be iden-
tical for all sellers and no incentive to reduce the price would exist be-
cause rivals would learn of and promptly match any firm's effort at price
shading. 154
The ALJ's opinion, resolving this conflict in favor of complaint
counsel's characterization, focused on other structural features of the in-
dustry-the geographic dispersion of customers, that sales were not
open, and that a relatively small number of large buyers made substan-
tial annual purchases-to show that uniform list prices and minimal dis-
counts were not inevitable. In addition, complaint counsel had
presented live testimony from industry participants intended to show
that the challenged practices affected the way in which firms behaved.
The ALJ's opinion concluded that firms appeared to obtain information
about price moves from the public announcement of list price
changes. 155 The uniform delivered price system simplified the problem
of matching list prices. Industry executives were reluctant to give dis-
counts because of the most-favored-customer clause and rival firms un-
derstood the effect of such a clause. Moreover, the FTC's expert
economic witness testified that the practices had a significant impact on
price competition.
With respect to the possible competitive benefits from the chal-
lenged practices, 156 the ALJ concluded that while any one customer
might benefit from advance notice, a most-favored-customer clause, or
uniform delivered prices, the industry-wide use of these practices re-
sulted in an higher level of prices. Therefore, "[a]ny procompetitive
benefits of the challenged practices [were] clearly outweighed by their
anticompetitive attributes. 1 5 7
The Ethyl initial opinion, when combined with Boise Cascade, pro-
vides support for an "indirect collusion" approach under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Under this approach, the FTC does
not need to establish an agreement, explicit or tacit, if it can show that
the firms' facilitating practices have the collective effect or reducing
competition. However, even absent the need to show agreement, the
154 Defendants also introduced testimony that decisionmakers perceived the Robinson-
Patman Act as an obstacle to selective discounts. The ALJ rejected this explanation. Ste id.
at 56.
155 Id. at 86-89.
156 The FTC agreed that the practices had not been instituted for the purpose of elimi-
nating competition. Indeed, uniform delivered prices and most-favored-customer clauses may
have been used by Ethyl when it was the sole supplier of antiknock additives prior to 1948.
Hence the FTC could not infer from an anticompetitive purpose that the practices had no
competitive benefits. Moreover, defendants presented testimony that individual customers
desired and, in the case of most-favored-customer clauses, bargained for the challenged prac-
tices. See id. at 54-56.
157 Id. at 160.
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FTC's burden of proof substantially exceeds that which is required in a
standard conspiracy case where the per se rule applies. Under the facili-
tating practices approach, the FTC will need to demonstrate that the
industry performance is noncompetitive in some respects and that the
result is attributable to the cited practices. Moreover, the FTC may
have to demonstrate that the adverse effects on competition are not off-
set by aspects of the practices that enhance efficiency or otherwise pro-
mote competition.
CONCLUSION
Economic theory about oligopoly behavior can contribute little to
antitrust analysis in situations where direct evidence exists of a formal
conspiracy to fix prices or otherwise avoid competition. Where the
agreement is not facially anticompetitive, or where no formal agreement
can be established from direct evidence, an economic model of oligopoly
behavior is useful and, perhaps, essential.
A problem arises, however, in using conventional economic theory
in attempting to establish antitrust liability, however. The standard
economic model of oligopoly, which is premised on separate profit-maxi-
mizing decisions by each firm that treat the likely reaction of rivals sim-
ply as a parameter, virtually precludes any extension of antitrust beyond
situations where formal conspiracy can be proved. Liability is avoided
because in the standard model, nothing that the individual oligopolist
has done appears to be culpable; its decisionmaking merely takes into
account the assumed reaction of rivals.
This Article has offered an alternative economic model in which
the focus is on the ingredients that are necessary for oligopolists to
achieve and maintain a noncompetitive price. It points to the compli-
cating factors that stand in the way of that result and argues that such
results are seldom likely to occur unless oligopolists take specific actions
aimed at circumventing or overcoming the complicating factors.
The economic model can be useful in several contexts. First, where
the plaintiff believes that a formal agreement exists, but no direct evi-
dence of such an agreement is available, the economic model points to
the circumstances that permit an inference of such an agreement in a
particular industry structure. Second, the model can analyze formal
agreements, such as information-exchange agreements, that do not on
their face eliminate competition, but when viewed in the context of the
particular industry structure, may be seen as posing serious risks of re-
ducing the level of competition.
Finally, where neither direct nor circumstantial evidence of a for-
mal agreement exists, the model suggests a useful way of determining
whether any culpable behavior can be identified. The approach sug-
gested by the economic model differs considerably from the traditional
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legal approach, which has concentrated on expanding the notion of
agreement. This Article suggests a more straightforward attack on the
practices that facilitate the noncompetitive outcome. When the focus is
on the specific actions taken by oligopolists, formal collusion is seen as
merely a particularly nefarious subset of a broader class of behavior.
When conditions permit, other actions can be equally effective in
achieving the same noncompetitive result. To distinguish among these
various categories of behavior based on whether an agreement exists
seems largely an exercise in semantics.
The approach to this third category suggested in this Article is com-
patible with recent prosecutorial efforts under both the Sherman Act
and the Federal Trade Commission Act. The best line of attack is under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, because proof of an
agreement is unnecessary.' 58 One aspect of limiting the facilitating
practices approach to FTC enforcement is to remove the possibility of
private treble damage actions. This has appeal if some unfairness is per-
ceived in exposing firms to damages for behavior which is culpable only
because of the particular structural circumstances of the industry under
scrutiny.
158 Although a plaintiff may be able to succeed with the same facts under the Sherman
Act, it still may be necessary to construe the behavior as constituting some form of agreement.
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